Three Decades of Engaging Central Asia

Gitesh Sarma - Vice President, India-Central Asia Foundation (ICAF)

India is likely to be a role model for the Central Asian States, for pursuing independent foreign policies against the backdrop of the conflict and confrontation involving Russia, China and the West. India should have realistic expectations about connectivity projects and coordinate its activities with Russia. The sense is that India is on the right track.

Introduction

In geopolitical terms, Central Asia is strategically located and India’s engagement with this region certainly matters. Overall, India’s thirty-year engagement with the CAS, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, is satisfactory with room for more work. This positive assessment is notwithstanding that India has an annual trade with the region of around USD 2 billion compared with China’s at about USD 100 billion. But such a comparison is misleading because India lacks adequate connectivity.

While there are expectations of more content in the relationship on account of the ‘emotional connect’ between the peoples of India and Central Asia, these are difficult to fully meet. Where for centuries travellers, culture, ideas and merchandise had moved seamlessly, such two-way flows were interrupted when the British came to the subcontinent and the Russian Empire expanded into Central Asia.

A challenging territory now lies in between, making shipment of cargoes difficult. The common element coming out is that terrorism, extremism and drug trafficking emanating from Afghanistan and Pakistan threaten both India and the CAS. Fighters of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and other militant groups connected to Central Asia have operated with relative impunity from the Af-Pak region.

The major trade corridors in various stages of implementation depend on Iran providing transit facilities. The International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) links India and Russia with branches to CAS using ship, rail and road routes. The Chabahar Port being developed by India in Iran gives the possibility of access to Afghanistan and CAS bypassing Pakistan.

And the Ashgabat Agreement (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Iran, India, Pakistan and Oman) is an arrangement facilitating the flow of goods between CAS and the Persian Gulf. Such routes take time to mature and there are additional challenges on account of Western sanctions on Iran.

Although Central Asia, based on shared characteristics and history, qualifies to be a distinct region, each of the constituent countries have their individual identities. An important gain is that India today is more familiar with the region and therefore better prepared to deal with them bilaterally and collectively.

Structured Engagement

In January 2022 PM Narendra Modi hosted the first India-Central Asia Summit with the participation of the Presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. This Heads of State meeting was India’s first structured engagement with CAS and was preceded by the India-Central Asia Dialogue in January 2019 in Samarkand at foreign minister level.

The key outcomes of Prime Minister Modi’s meeting were:

(i) Summit meetings would take place every two years and a supporting Secretariat (India-Central Asia Centre) would be established in New Delhi.

(ii) An ‘India-Central Asia Parliamentary Forum,’ would be created.

(iii) MoUs were signed for implementation of High Impact Community Development Projects (HICDPs) in CAS based on Indian grant assistance.

(iv) Increased training slots were to be provided for CAS diplomats at the Sushma Swaraj Institute.

(v) Cooperation was proposed in medicine, healthcare, pharmaceuticals, education, IT, BPO, infrastructure, agriculture and agricultural products, energy, space industry, textiles, leather and footwear, gems & jewellery.

(vi) Connectivity projects were to be given attention, including the International North South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and the Ashgabat Agreement on International Trade and Transit Corridor. India offered Chabahar for trade and the establishment of a Joint Working Group (JWG) on this port.

(vii) A Security Council's Dialogue would deal with terrorism, extremism and radicalization.

(viii) The Summit agreed that the situation in Afghanistan impacted the security and stability of the region. They expressed support for a peaceful, secure and stable Afghanistan and respect for its sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity and on non-interference in its internal affairs. Afghan territory should not be used for sheltering, training, planning and financing terror acts.

This institutionalised mechanism can provide continuous oversight over the India-CAS relationship and also supplement the engagement within regional forums like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Interestingly, apart from the connectivity challenge, other issues from three decades back continue to be relevant even today.

Russia as the Dominant Power

Russia remains the most influential power in Central Asia even after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. It has pushed for the creation of regional structures besides working within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) framework. Some such initiatives are:

(i) The Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) was founded in 2002 when six countries (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan) agreed to create a military alliance

Leaders from the Collective Security Treaty Organization, 2018. | President of Russia X

(ii) The Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) was formed in 2000, followed by a Customs Union in 2010. The founding states of the Eurasian Customs Union were Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan and Armenia and Kyrgyzstan subsequently acceded.

(iii) The ‘Shanghai Five’ grouping was established by China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan in 1996 and, after adding Uzbekistan in 2001, emerged as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The grouping further expanded in 2017 to admit India and Pakistan, Iran in 2023 and Belarus in 2024.

These mostly overlapping regional arrangements help Russia manage Central Asian affairs. But there is scope for countries like China and India to undertake activities in the region, provided they do not threaten Russian dominance, which takes overall responsibility for CAS security. However, in recent times, China has moved beyond economic engagement by taking an interest in security matters in this region with a related presence in Tajikistan.

There are almost ten million migrants from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in Russia. Their remittances (approximately USD 25 billion in 2022) are useful in sustaining CAS economies. Radicalization of this community is a troubling factor for Moscow.

Leadership Matters

CAS has had a tradition of strongmen as leaders and governance usually revolves around them. Post-independence, a new set of leaders have emerged in these countries who are still cast in the same mould as their predecessors and they may look towards Moscow when threatened.

In Ukraine, CAS leaders have focussed more on the ‘regime change' aspect implemented by the West to remove the pro-Russia President Viktor Yanukovych. Russia will always closely monitor political processes in CAS given their potential to cause changes in leadership, to ensure that they do not threaten its interests. For example, when violence rocked Kazakhstan in January 2022, it invoked the CSTO mechanism and Russian troops helped to restore order.

Afghanistan

The prospects of spillover of extremism and terrorism from Afghanistan into Central Asia have always been worrisome. Two years after Soviet forces retreated from Afghanistan in 1989, the USSR disintegrated. Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan became frontline states in relation to Afghanistan and the other two, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, were exposed too. And in August 2021, when US troops left Afghanistan, their vulnerability came to the fore again.

Broadly, Turkmenistan follows a foreign policy of neutrality and is ready to deal with all Afghan groups. Taliban cooperation can make the TAPI gas pipeline project, being discussed since the 1990s, a reality. Tajikistan has not engaged with the current Taliban regime. It depends on Russia to secure its Afghan frontier.

Uzbekistan emphasises its humanitarian presence in Afghanistan while pushing its rail connectivity project to link CAS with South Asia. The Kazakhs and Kyrgyz also follow a humanitarian approach towards Afghanistan. Present indications are that Russia has started the process of removing Taliban from the list of banned terrorist organisations and CAS are likely to follow suit.

China

Many would consider the Chinese territory of Xinjiang as part of Central Asia in historical, cultural and ethnic terms. China is ready to deal firmly with any signs of unrest there. Like India, China has established a summit mechanism with the five CAS countries and held the first meeting in Xian in May 2023.

China has practised ‘debt trap diplomacy’ resulting in a total debt burden on the CAS of USD 15.7 billion in early 2023. Debt to China accounted for almost 37 percent of Kyrgyzstan’s external liabilities in the second half of 2023. Uzbekistan’s largest creditor was China on 1 July 2023, and it owed USD 3.8 billion. CAS today is more cautious in accessing Chinese credit.

While gas pipelines and railway lines create the impression of a long-term partnership, it is more a relationship of dependency and dominance. Countries like Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan have tried to use natural resources to meet their debt repayment obligations. Attempts to lease land to the Chinese have resulted in street protests in both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.

Legacy Issues

Following the disintegration of the USSR, there were difficulties in relations between CAS countries over such issues as border demarcation, treatment of ethnic minorities, and hydropower projects on transboundary rivers. There were tensions in ties between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan and between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, for instance. The situation improved after the demise of Uzbek President Islam Karimov in 2016, and CAS leaders have been meeting regularly to discuss regional cooperation.

Legacy issues also have had a bearing on ties with India. Tashkent hosted the India-Pakistan peace negotiations after the 1965 war and has tried to equate India and Pakistan. Such hyphenation has, however, ended with India’s increased international stature and good relations with the West. Kazakhstan gave up its claim to Soviet nuclear weapons on its territory following the end of the Soviet Union.

India’s nuclear tests of 1998, followed by the NSG waiver in 2008, posed a challenge to the CAS. Article 8 of the Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty of 2006 commits the CAS not to supply nuclear items to any non-nuclear-weapon State, ‘unless that State has concluded with the IАЕА а comprehensive safeguards agreement.’ Since then, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have moved on to export uranium to India.

Prospects

Russia’s continued relevance should not be underestimated. Neither should China’s success in engaging with the region be overestimated. India’s presence in SCO gives comfort to CAS while dealing with Russia and China. Pakistan’s utility would be its perceived ability to influence terrorist groups active in the region. Transit routes through Pakistan territory presently are more about symbolism than anything else.

India is likely to be a role model for CAS for pursuing independent foreign policies against the backdrop of the conflict and confrontation involving Russia, China and the West. India should have realistic expectations about connectivity projects and coordinate its activities with Russia. The sense is that India is on the right track.

(Exclusive to NatStrat)