Indian intermediate-range ballistic missile Agni-III with a nuclear warhead | AP Photo / Manish Swarup
The purpose of nuclear weapons should be to deter use, not bait their use; threatening first use could tempt pre-emption. By its no first use, India reassures the adversary that it need not be quick to use its weapons for the fear that it could lose them to an Indian attack. Meanwhile, India prevents the eventuality of adversary’s nuclear use with the promise of a massive retaliation. Deterring without provoking is the best form of deterrence and India’s nuclear doctrine performs this task. Is a revision then called for?
Introduction
It has been a quarter of a century since India’s draft nuclear doctrine in August 1999[1], and then the CCS Press Note operationalizing the doctrine in January 2003[2], were placed in the public domain. Since then, the doctrinal attributes have evoked debate and discussion at home and abroad. While outside voices have questioned the seriousness of India’s commitment to credible minimum deterrence (CMD) and no first use (NFU), some within the country have been concerned that India should not take these commitments too seriously! Rumblings of discontent have been heard in the Indian strategic community on the doctrine’s efficacy in face of the security challenges from the neighbouring nuclear armed adversaries. After all, Pakistan continues cross-border terrorism leading to a feeling that despite India’s nuclear weapons, it can ‘take India for a ride’. Meanwhile, China’s ongoing conventional and nuclear modernization and a growing assertiveness evoke a sense of apprehension. This is further exacerbated by the fear of collusion between China and Pakistan on strategic matters, including a nuclear and missile proliferation nexus. Pakistan has served as China’s proxy, while using terrorism as its own surrogate. In the face of such security concerns, the Indian nuclear doctrine is criticised for being inert and out of step with the changing times and capabilities of the adversaries.
Rumblings of discontent have been heard in the Indian strategic community on the doctrine’s efficacy in face of the security challenges from the neighbouring nuclear armed adversaries. After all, Pakistan continues cross-border terrorism leading to a feeling that despite India’s nuclear weapons, it can ‘take India for a ride’. Meanwhile, China’s ongoing conventional and nuclear modernization and a growing assertiveness evoke a sense of apprehension. This is further exacerbated by the fear of collusion between China and Pakistan on strategic matters, including a nuclear and missile proliferation nexus. Pakistan has served as China’s proxy, while using terrorism as its own surrogate. In the face of such security concerns, the Indian nuclear doctrine is criticised for being inert and out of step with the changing times and capabilities of the adversaries.
Developments at the international level are also contributing to this sentiment. For instance, the US concern about facing a “multiple nuclear challenger problem” from Russia, China and North Korea is pushing it towards reassessing its nuclear “hardware” (capabilities, posture and operations) and “software” (strategic concepts, plans and engagements).[3] The inference drawn from here is that if the USA with such a formidable arsenal finds it inadequate to meet its threats, how can India be satisfied with minimum deterrence?
Similarly, there are concerns about the possibility of use of low yield or ‘tactical’ nuclear weapons by Russia in its ongoing conflict with Ukraine and the possible lessons that may be learnt by China for dealing with regional contingencies. India’s nuclear doctrine does not mention tactical nuclear weapons. Does that not place India in a disadvantageous position? So, the regional and international situation is causing concern and adding to the domestic voices seeking revision of India’s nuclear doctrine.
Doctrines are obviously not cast in stone. They are living documents that speak to a threat. Governments review them periodically and from what is known in the public domain, such exercises have been undertaken in the case of India’s nuclear doctrine. However, no reason has yet been found to be compelling enough to revise it. This may not be surprising because the doctrine does stand on a firm understanding of the political and military role of nuclear weapons and how best to practise nuclear deterrence.
India has explained the rationale for its nuclear weapons in terms of the need to safeguard itself against nuclear coercion or blackmail. Maintaining a political role for its nuclear weapons, the doctrine accepts No First Use (NFU). It holds that the weapon has no role in enforcing compellnce or staging aggression and can only be meaningfully employed to deter an adversary from using such a weapon by holding out the promise, as the doctrine does, of assured retaliation to inflict unacceptable damage.
Understanding Nuances
To translate these principles into credible deterrence, the doctrine must be operationalised into a workable strategy comprising three pillars – capability (warheads and delivery vectors), resolve (robust military command and control as well as decisive political decision making), and communication of both through effective signalling and posture. In order to appreciate this better, it would be useful to understand nuances of terms such as doctrine, strategy and posture which are often used interchangeably.[4] The three, however, operate on different planes and perform different tasks.
A nuclear doctrine is a set of guiding principles that encapsulates the philosophy or explains the raison d’etre of one’s nuclear weapons. It answers fundamental questions of when, how and where the weapon would be used for the sake of national security. The doctrine, therefore, offers a conceptual framework and conveys a sense of the country’s worldview, what it seeks to do and how. Beliefs that form the foundation of a nuclear doctrine emanate from the strategic culture of a nation and reflect its personality, not of the government of the moment. In this sense, the doctrine can be relatively abiding and timeless. It could change when the nation alters its belief systems and the role of nuclear weapons. The doctrine becomes a guide for strategy.
A strategy is a plan designed to achieve an aim through the employment of necessary capabilities. For instance, when India’s nuclear doctrine propounds the principle of NFU, then the strategy must ensure a survivable arsenal of a stockpile of warheads, necessary delivery vectors based on a triad, and a robust and redundant command and control system that can convey deterrence by punishment. Strategy must decide how the protection of the nuclear forces is to be ensured to withstand a first strike and yet signal credible retaliation.
A posture, meanwhile, conveys how the nuclear forces are operationally maintained. Unlike doctrine or strategy, posture is more fluid as it modifies with changing capabilities and threat environment and could become more or less offensive or defensive. For instance, during the Cold War, the US and USSR kept their nuclear forces on high alert postures. But, since the end of the Cold War, this posture has progressively relaxed. India’s own nuclear posture has evolved from recessed deterrence to a relatively more ready state, especially with canisterised missiles and operational SSBNs, though it is far from a posture of hair trigger readiness.
The rejection of the concept of nuclear war fighting frees India from the need for such a posture or even to match the nuclear arsenal of its adversary/(ies) weapon for weapon. Fortunately, it is not very difficult to impose punishment with nuclear weapons. By their very nature, they cause huge damage, which cannot be restricted in time and space to life, property and even the environment.
Moreover, given the high density of population in this region, punishing a first user with unacceptable damage neither calls for the kinds of numbers that the Superpowers built, nor the kinds of yields that they experimented with. A sufficient number of kiloton weapons dispersed intelligently over the target and made to explode at an intelligent height to maximise damage would suffice for credible deterrence.
Translating Doctrine into Strategy
The Indian nuclear doctrine is premised on this sound logic. However, its operationalisation into a credible deterrent strategy is a work in progress. Over the last decade, efforts have been visible in the development and gradual deployment of several land-based ballistic missiles of varying ranges. More recently, a missile with MIRV technology has also been tested.[5]Another important development has been the commissioning of its second SSBN, INS Arighat. With this India has moved a step closer to enhancing the level of survivability.[6]
Second Arihant-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine INS Arighat | X/@InsightGL
However, more tasks remain. A submarine launched ballistic missile version of Agni V on a suitable platform should be the next milestone in service of credible deterrence. Meanwhile, survivability must also be ensured through over and underground deception. Hardening of nuclear storage sites as well as command and control, including communication, will also have to be a continuous effort given the changing threat perceptions in the cyber domain and the increasing accuracy of conventional missiles.
Besides focus on requisite capability, credible deterrence also demands visibility of resolve at two levels. One, at the military level, it is showcased through the organisational set up reflecting robust processes for institutional decision-making. In this context, a strengthening of the public profile of the Strategic Forces Command, including knowledge about the existence of this tri-service organisation and its role and mandate would assure the Indian public, while simultaneously sending a signal of intent and purpose to the adversary. Second, resolve at the political level also needs to be communicated because possessing the best of capability would be meaningless if the adversary doubts the resolve of the country to put it to use. Fortunately, communication of resolve does not require conduct of a conventional or nuclear war. That would be foolish. It can be well showcased through a diverse set of actions such as stringent law and order enforcement, firmness in policy making, or the government’s ability to take hard decisions.
Based on the guidance provided by the doctrine, India has been steadily building its capability. This is evident to the adversary and nuclear deterrence cannot be doubted to be in place. One could always argue about how credible the adversary perceives it to be. But let us not forget that every adversary would publicly like to underplay the strength of the other’s nuclear deterrence. If the game of capability construction and perception management is played well, none can take a chance of calling the other’s nuclear bluff.
Continued Value of Conventional Deterrence amid Nuclear Developments
India’s security concerns regarding use of cross border terrorism by Pakistan and salami slicing by China must be dealt with at the conventional level. Nuclear weapons, or the nuclear doctrine, are not the answer to these threats. Adequate conventional capability needs to be built to establish deterrence, or fight on one’s own terms in case it breaks down.
In fact, it would be best to keep responses to such actions far from the nuclear threshold because nuclear weapons can never be credible instruments for responding to terror attacks or border transgressions. The nuclear doctrine does not deserve the blame for such behaviour by the adversary. Frustration to deal with these must be handled by finding the right military instruments and strategies, as also apt political mechanisms for engagement.
On the nuclear front, India’s focus should be on some of the new technological developments that could have implications for the survivability of its nuclear assets. Three of these can be mentioned as a way of illustration. The first is the conventional–nuclear entanglement, including use of accurate conventional missiles to target nuclear assets; second, improved ISR capabilities that could make nuclear forces more visible; and third, a possible induction of autonomous systems for nuclear delivery. Each of these will have to be evaluated for their implications on how India ensures survivability of its retaliatory forces.
Conclusion
Evidently then, there is more work needed at the strategy level – capability development and signalling – than revision of the doctrine. The principles as enshrined in the doctrine remain valid even in the face of changing regional and global landscape. CMD provides ample flexibility to adjust numbers as India deems necessary for causing unacceptable damage. The arsenal size is a judgement for the country to make and the numbers will always be dynamic. The philosophy of CMD, however, wisely refrains the country from a mindless and draining berserk stockpile accumulation.
At the same time, NFU is a militarily sound tenet since no nation can hope to defend itself with the use of nuclear weapons against another nation that possesses a secure second-strike arsenal. The purpose of nuclear weapons should be to deter use, not bait their use; threatening first use could tempt pre-emption. By its no first use, India reassures the adversary that it need not be quick to use its weapons for the fear that it could lose them to an Indian attack. Meanwhile, India prevents the eventuality of adversary’s nuclear use with the promise of a massive retaliation.
Deterring without provoking is the best form of deterrence and India’s nuclear doctrine performs this task. Is a revision then called for?
(Exclusive to NatStrat)
Endnotes:
