Contours of India’s engagement with the Afghan Taliban

Dr Bhashyam Kasturi - Consultant, MP-IDSA and a former Director, National Security Council Secretariat

With President Trump having since taken office, differences over contacts with the Taliban between India and the US may well surface. This became clear when Prime Minister Modi met with President Trump in Washington in the second week of February and conveyed that its Afghanistan policy was aligned with its national interests. However, India must have the ability to quickly mold its stance according to the prevailing security environment in Afghanistan and relations with the US. In the interim, it will be a good idea to maximise outreach towards making the Chabahar Agreement operational again. The results of this endeavour in the medium term will shape India’s forward movement in Afghanistan.

New Delhi increases engagement with the Taliban

Vikram Misri, India’s Foreign Secretary, met with Amir Khan Muttaqi, acting Foreign Minister of Afghanistan in Dubai on 8 January 2025. The timing of the meeting, coming as it did ahead of Donald Trump being sworn in as the 47^th President of the United States, shows the importance India attaches to Afghanistan. It was the highest level contact between India and the Taliban-led Afghan government since the 2021 takeover. Officially, both sides discussed aspects of India’s humanitarian and development assistance to Afghanistan. However, the fact that discussions took place in stand-alone mode and included delegations indicates that this interaction was planned for in advance or rather is part of chronological continuity in engagement.

Short of immediate diplomatic recognition of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, India has stepped up engagement to ensure that its interests are secured. If the past is any indication, discussions on Pakistan would have been central because New Delhi follows the Kautilyan dictum, “My enemy’s enemy is my friend”. That is why the MEA press release of the Dubai meeting, inter alia, states, “The Afghan side underlined its sensitivities to India’s security concerns.”

Previous conversations in Kabul with the Taliban establishment were focused on re-starting technical and consular activity that had come to a halt post the takeover of Kabul four years ago. In June 2022, India made a conscious decision to send a technical team to talk with the Taliban based on the ground realities in Afghanistan. Other countries like Russia and China had already been in touch with the Taliban. The United States and Europe are of course dead against the Taliban for their abysmal human rights record and ill-treatment of women.

India has chosen the middle path by seeking to assist the people of Afghanistan. The Dubai meeting is really an extension of that policy and nothing more. India’s development imperative is reflected in the MEA release of the January 2025 meeting which states that Vikram Misri underlined, “India’s historic friendship with the Afghan people” and conveyed New Delhi’s readiness to “urgent developmental needs of the Afghan people.”

The Taliban’s desire to strengthen ties with India

The Afghan Taliban today seeks enhanced Indian assistance because it urgently needs health care and education. From a security perspective, past precedence shows that the influx of unwanted elements from Afghanistan and; the smuggling of gold, cigarettes and drugs into India has created instability. The risks increase manifold with the Afghan Taliban in power now. The memory of the hijacked Indian Airlines plane IC-814 on the tarmac in Kabul with the Afghan Taliban acting as mediators is still fresh in the minds of Indian security planners.

The official Afghan statement of the Misri-Muttaqi meeting expresses a desire to strengthen ties with India in all spheres “as a key regional and economic player”. It is in this context that Muttaqi sought to raise the level of diplomatic ties with India, indirectly suggesting that New Delhi should take steps to re-establish bilateral relations, short of formally recognising the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.

The Taliban spokesperson, Hafiz Zia stated on X, that they formally asked India to resume issuing visas for Afghan businessmen, students and patients. India obviously has its reservations on account of the security risks involved but the Taliban claimed that it would vet all applications for visas. Zia, in fact, went on to claim that both sides had agreed to facilitate trade and visa processes. This remains to be confirmed by the Indian side.

Indian aid to Afghanistan. | PTI.

Kabul’s latest approach to India will certainly irk Islamabad, with whom ties are currently at an all-time low. The strategic importance of the India-Afghanistan meeting becomes apparent when we see that both sides agreed to use Chahbahar Port to “support trade and commercial activities”, including the sending of humanitarian aid to Kabul. The revitalisation of the tripartite India, Iran and Afghanistan agreement of 2016 on transit and transport, also known as the Chabahar Agreement, becomes imperative for this initiative to succeed.

Pertinently, last year India and Iran signed a ten-year contract for operation of the port. Additionally, India offered Iran a line of credit of $250 million for mutually beneficial projects relating to Chabahar. India has been using the port to send goods, medicines and other materials to Afghanistan, made possible because of a waiver given by the US. This situation could however change with President Trump’s 6 February 2025 national security memorandum aimed at cutting off Iran’s financial links, including port operations. The impact of the latest US move on India’s Chabahar operations could well de-rail India’s Afghan links, if the previous waiver is done away with by the current US administration.

Tracing India-Taliban contacts since 2021

For the record, it is worth tracing the numerous contacts India has had with the Taliban since 2021. In August that year, Deepak Mittal, then India’s Ambassador to Qatar, met with Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanekzai. India then expressed its security concerns about militants in Afghanistan using Afghan soil to target India and Indian interests. Stanekzai, an alumni of the Indian Military Academy, assured that India’s interests would not be harmed. Subsequently, in June 2022, a team of officials led by MEA Joint Secretary J.P. Singh travelled to Kabul where they met with Amir Khan Muttaqi, acting Minister of Foreign Affairs and Stanekzai, to discuss the continuance of Indian aid to Afghanistan.

Notably, Anas Haqqani, the Interior Minister and Mullah Yaqub, the Defence Minister, requested India in June 2022 to re-start diplomatic activities at its embassy in Kabul. Yaqub claimed the Taliban was interested in military and strategic cooperation with India! Subsequently, India partially reopened its embassy in Kabul to facilitate ‘technical’ cooperation. Then, in October 2022, India signed an agreement aimed at increasing the volume of trade with Afghanistan, especially through the air corridor. Knowing the enormous risks involved in agreeing to the Taliban’s latest request in Dubai for India to reopen its embassy, New Delhi would have most likely merely stated that it would examine the same.

One of the main reasons for engagement post-2021 is that when the Taliban was in power in Kabul from 1996 to 2001, India had withdrawn all diplomatic and consular staff. This made the resumption of overt and covert contacts in 2002 a mammoth task. Despite the risks, this experience must have given the impetus to establish and maintain contact with the Taliban administration after 2021.

The fact that over forty countries already have some form of contact with the Taliban or are represented diplomatically in Kabul, also provided the underpinnings for India’s contacts. Prima facie, India’s policy is based on the principle of securing its interests and keeping an eye on Pakistan. It is a risky gamble, given the fact that Pakistan and Afghan Taliban have always had a close relationship, with varying moments of mutual distrust. However, the current state of distrust between Kabul and Islamabad has provided an excellent opportunity for India.

Conclusion

With President Trump having since taken office, differences over contacts with the Taliban between India and the US may well surface. This became clear when Prime Minister Modi met with President Trump in Washington in the second week of February and conveyed that its Afghanistan policy was aligned with its national interests.

However, India must have the ability to quickly mold its stance according to the prevailing security environment in Afghanistan and relations with the US. In the interim, it will be a good idea to maximise outreach towards making the Chabahar Agreement operational again. The results of this endeavour in the medium term will shape India’s forward movement in Afghanistan.

(Exclusive to NatStrat)